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Studying the Formulation of Incremental Development 
Approaches 
Robert Mortlock – Dr. Mortlock managed defense systems acquisition efforts for the last 15 of his 27 
years in the U.S. Army, culminating in his assignment as the project manager for Soldier Protection 
and Individual Equipment in Program Executive Office for Soldier. He holds a PhD in chemical 
engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, an MBA from Webster University, an MS in 
national resource strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a BS in chemical 
engineering from Lehigh University. He is also a graduate from the Post-Doctoral Bridge Program of 
the University of Florida’s Hough Graduate School of Business. 
Abstract 
The research surveys acquisition professionals for a recommended acquisition strategy for a 
typical acquisition program facing a milestone approval. This work provides insights into the 
importance of typical programmatic decision inputs (requirements, technology maturity, risk, 
urgency, and funding) to the formulation of an acquisition strategy. The research uses the 
Joint Common Missile (JCM) program and the subsequent Joint Air Ground Missile (JAGM) 
program as the basis. A questionnaire asks acquisition professionals to develop an 
acquisition strategy for the JCM program based on approved requirements, a technology risk 
assessment, and planned funding. The recommended strategies are compared to the actual 
strategy implemented in the JAGM program. The work highlights that once the program’s 
cost and schedule parameters are planned, the program’s only risk mitigation strategy is to 
delay desired capability to later increments. This research suggests that acquisition policy 
should require development programs to establish firm targets for cost and schedule and 
allow the services the ability to fit only what is affordable from a performance (requirements) 
perspective into the first increment of the program of record by delaying the achievement of 
some requirements to subsequent increments to allow more time for technology maturation.  
Paper Keywords: critical thinking, decision-making, project management, acquisition strategy 
formulation 
Introduction 
Within U.S. defense acquisition, an evolutionary strategy with an incremental 
development approach is the preferred strategy for most acquisition programs (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 
2007). The basic advantage over a single-step acquisition developmental approach is that 
the warfighter gets some capability sooner rather than waiting for full capability. Figure 1 
outlines the basic advantage of the incremental approach versus a single-step approach, 
where the warfighter or user gets no capability until the end of a successful development. In 
contrast, using the incremental approach, the warfighter gets improved capability (over their 
existing level) in a shorter time period. 
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Figure 1. Single Step Versus Incremental Development Approach 
But how hard is it for program managers (PMs) to recommend and implement this 
approach? This research studies how difficult it is for a PM to implement an evolutionary 
acquisition (EA) with an incremental development (ID) approach. The research focuses on 
analyzing the importance of typical program data, such as requirements, technology 
maturity, risk, and funding, as inputs to the PM decision-making process for determining a 
recommended acquisition strategy. The study goals are to provide insights into the unique 
challenges within the defense acquisition institution and provide acquisition policy reform 
recommendations. The work aligns with general research in the areas of project 
management, defense acquisition reform, strategic management, and organizational 
behavior. This research supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy approach to reform 
the Department of Defense (DoD) for greater performance and affordability (DoD, 2018) and 
also addresses the challenges of “enabling effective acquisition and contract management” 
highlighted in the 2018 DoD Inspector General (IG) report titled Top Management 
Challenges: Fiscal Year 2018.   
According to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, dated 
November 20, 2007, responsiveness is one of five policies that governs the defense 
acquisition system. Specifically, DoDD 5000.01 defines responsiveness as follows: 
Advanced technology shall be integrated into producible systems and 
deployed in the shortest time practicable. Approved, time-phased capability 
needs matched with available technology and resources enable evolutionary 
acquisition strategies. Evolutionary acquisition strategies are the preferred 
approach to satisfying operational needs. Incremental development is the 
preferred process for executing such strategies. (OUSD[AT&L], 2007)  
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The accompanying DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 (2008), Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, further expands on the use incremental development strategies. In fact, 
the words “incremental and/or increment(s)” appear more than 52 times in the approximately 
100-page instruction (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). The DoDI 5000.02 recognizes the importance of 
a modular open systems approach (MOSA)―modular designs coupled with open business 
models―to successfully implement incremental development efforts. Figure 2 outlines a 
basic incremental development strategy across the five phases of the acquisition framework, 
from material solution analysis (MSA) to technology maturation and risk reduction (TMRR) to 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) to production and deployment (PD) to 
operations and support (OS). Key enablers for a successful implementation of an 
incremental development (ID) approach include time-phased requirements, MOSA, 
integrated test & evaluation (T&E), and sustainment strategies, as well as full funding for 
each increment.   
 
Figure 2. Standard Incremental Development Approach 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) reinforces the DoDD 5000.01 and DoDI 
5000.02 by mentioning “increment(s)” or “incremental” hundreds of times in this 1,230-page 
document (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2012). The DAG defines an increment as 
“a militarily useful and supportable operational capability that can be developed, produced, 
deployed, and sustained” (DAU, 2012). Furthermore, the recently approved Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01H, dated August 31, 2018, which replaced 
the CJCSI 3170.01 series, continues the theme on the importance on time-phased 
requirements for the success of EA strategies and ID efforts (CJCS, 2015, 2018).    
Despite the emphasis on ID approaches both in DoD acquisition and requirements 
policy documents and regulations, many program managers (PMs) struggle to successfully 
implement the preferred approach. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and RAND 
reports continue to highlight the importance of EA and ID approaches as widely accepted 
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best practices in commercial industry. For example, a 2010 GAO report titled Defense 
Acquisitions—Strong Leadership Is the Key to Planning and Executing Stable Weapons 
Programs studied the stability of DoD major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and 
found that only 21% appeared to be stable (GAO, 2010). The GAO reported that stable 
MDAPs “pursued evolutionary or incremental acquisition strategies, leveraged mature 
technologies, and established realistic cost and schedule estimates that accounted for risk” 
(GAO, 2010). In many instances, defense acquisition programs that have incrementally 
fielded capabilities fall into the category of programs that have upgraded a very successful 
initial warfighting capability―that is, the future increments were never envisioned from the 
original requirements. The subsequent increments were natural upgrades to the initial 
capability and were a more affordable way of delivering increased capability to the 
warfighter rather than an expensive, new development effort.  
This research focuses on programs that do not have time-phased requirements. In 
this situation, PMs use the inputs of urgency, resources (primarily funding), and technology 
maturity (primarily technology readiness levels and risk assessments) to try to develop a 
strategy to meet the warfighters’ required needs and timelines, as well as being affordable 
for the service. Implementing an appropriate incremental development strategy requires 
strategic leadership and transparent information-sharing/decision-making as well as an 
understanding of the strategic environment, key stakeholders, change leadership, and 
organizational behavior.  
The goal of this research is to examine the difficulty in developing an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy with an incremental development approach. The objectives include the 
following:  
• Develop insights into the importance of typical programmatic decision inputs 
to the development of an acquisition strategy. 
• Provide insights into how PMs can better develop acquisition strategies 
based on requirements, technology maturity, risk, urgency, and funding. 
• Determine defense acquisition policy recommendations on how to better 
support the planning of successful incremental development acquisition 
strategies.   
The research uses the Joint Common Missile (JCM) program and the subsequent 
Joint Air Ground Missile (JAGM) program as the basis to survey acquisition professionals. A 
questionnaire asks acquisition professionals to develop an acquisition strategy for the JCM 
program based on approved requirements, a technology risk assessment, and funding 
documents. These recommended strategies are compared to the actual strategy 
implemented in the JAGM program.  
The primary research question is this: Can a PM or acquisition professional predict 
an effective acquisition strategy given typical programmatic decision inputs? The secondary 
research questions are the following: 
• What is the most important factor in determining the recommended 
acquisition strategy? 
• How can the decision input factors be changed to enable a PM or acquisition 
professional to recommend an appropriate, risk-based, knowledge-based, 
incremental development approach? 
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Background 
The section reviews the background of both EA and ID and presents a historical 
review of how policy, regulations, and statutes have changed over time with respect to 
guidance on EA and ID for PMs. The seeds for significant acquisition reform were set in the 
1980s. A 1986 RAND study titled Improving the Military Acquisition Process (Rich, Dews, & 
Batten, 1986) and A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the president by the President’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard; 1986; also known as the The 
Packard Report) outlined significant acquisition reform recommendations, many of which 
were later implemented. Groundbreaking legislation related to acquisition reform included 
the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which reorganized 
the DoD and strengthened civilian authority in the DoD, the 1990 Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA), and the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA). Although these 
transformational acts made no specific mention of EA or ID, they laid the groundwork for 
significant congressional involvement in acquisition reform (Goldwater–Nichols Department 
of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986; Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, 
1990; Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 1994; Federal Acquisition Reform Act, 1996).  
The National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) have also had a significant impact 
on defense acquisition reform. The fiscal year (FY) 1996 NDAA specifically calls for the 
incremental acquisition of information technology and for the use of modular contracting. 
Table 1 has a summary of the NDAAs from 1996 to 2017 with a count of the number 
of times the words “evolutionary,” “increment,” or “block” are referenced with respect to 
defense acquisition. The NDAAs from 1997 to 2002 do not mention the words 
“evolutionary,” “incremental,” or “block upgrades.” 
 
Table 1. NDAA Summary of EA and ID Word Use. Data From NDAAs Dated 1996–
2017. 
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The FY2003 NDAA required extensive reporting to Congress on “evolutionary 
acquisition of major defense acquisition programs” while specifically addressing spiral 
development efforts (NDAA, 2003). Section 802 required the Secretary of Defense to submit 
a report to the congressional defense committees on major defense acquisition programs 
that follow the evolutionary acquisition process (NDAA, 2003). The FY2003 NDAA went on 
to define the term evolutionary acquisition process as “a process by which an acquisition 
program is conducted through discrete phases or blocks, with each phase or block 
consisting of the planned definition, development, production or acquisition, and fielding of 
hardware or software that provides operationally useful capability” (NDAA, 2003). The term 
“increment … means one of the discrete phases or blocks of such program” (NDAA, 2003). 
With respect to spiral development, the NDAA authorizes the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct major defense acquisition programs as spiral development programs, defining the 
“spiral development program, with respect to a research and development program” as “a 
program that is conducted in discrete phases or blocks, each of which will result in the 
development of fieldable prototypes; and will not proceed into acquisition until specific 
performance parameters, including measurable exit criteria, have been met” (NDAA, 2003). 
The 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) reiterates the 
importance of time-phased requirements to the success of EA and ID approaches and 
states that “the process for developing requirements is structured to enable incremental, 
evolutionary, or spiral acquisition approaches, including the deferral of technologies that are 
not yet mature and capabilities that are likely to significantly increase costs or delay 
production until later increments or spirals” (WSARA, 2009). 
Recent NDAAs have continued to emphasize the use of EA and ID approaches. The 
FY2015 NDAA refers to modular open systems approaches in acquisition programs and 
requires “that increments of acquisition programs consider the extent to which the increment 
will implement open systems approaches as a whole” (NDAA, 2015). Congress seemed to 
double down on this same concept in the FY2017 NDAA, which states that “major defense 
acquisition program[s] … be designed and developed, to the maximum extent practicable, 
with a modular open system approach to enable incremental development and enhance 
competition, innovation, and interoperability” (NDAA, 2017). 
Clearly, over the years, Congress has included enough guidance on the application 
of EA and ID within DoD acquisition programs. In response to the statutory requirements 
and commercial industry best practices, the DoD acquisition community has gradually 
transformed its regulations, policies, and procedures. First, in the mid-1980s, EA using an ID 
approach was recognized as the best way to develop and deliver capabilities specifically for 
information technology like command and control systems which involved software-intensive 
development efforts. In 1987, the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) 
published the Joint Logistics Commander’s Guidance for the Use of an Evolutionary 
Acquisition (EA) Strategy in Acquiring Command and Control (C2). The guide encouraged  
consideration and use of an Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) strategy by the 
services in acquiring C2 systems. While this guidance is aimed specifically at 
the use of an EA strategy in acquiring Command and Control systems, the 
principles discussed may also be applicable to the acquisition of other kinds 
of systems. This EA strategy is of a character that the system is not required 
to have full capability when deployed, but will evolve to full capability through 
one or more incremental upgrades. Considered most broadly, EA consists of 
first sequentially defining, funding, developing, testing, fielding, supporting 
and evaluating increments of the system. (A’Hearn, Bergmen, & Hirsch, 
1987) 
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The guide defines EA as both “adaptive and incremental,” requiring a description of 
the overall capability desired with a concept of operation. EA defines a “core or baseline” 
capability necessary with an architectural framework upon which to build future increments 
for the delivery of the final desired full capability. The core or baseline element should 
“enhance the user’s mission capability” and “be fielded quickly and sustained in its 
operational environment.” The subsequent increments improve on the baseline capability by 
developing the requirements for subsequent increments through periodic performance 
updates based upon the input of the “developer-user-tester-supporter team as they test and 
assess system operational use.” The EA plan “is essentially a baseline from which 
adjustments are made as dictated by the results of continuing feedback from tests and 
assessment of operational use” (A’Hearn et al., 1987). 
The DoD 5000 series of regulations provide the basis for guidance to acquisition 
professionals, especially PMs. It is useful to study how the DoD 5000 series documents 
have evolved. In DoD’s 5000 Documents: Evolution and Change in Defense Acquisition 
Policy, Ferrara (1996) summarizes the changes in the DoD 5000 series from 1971 to 1993. 
Although not specifically focused on just EA or ID strategies, early versions of the 
documents laid the groundwork for later versions. It is interesting that the central themes of 
the original 1971 DoDD 5000.1 of “Centralized Policy, Decentralized Execution; Fly Before 
Buy; Streamlined Organizations; Limited Reporting Requirements; and Program Stability” 
remain relevant today (Office of the Director, Defense Research & Engineering [ODDR&E], 
1971).    
Table 2 summarizes the DoDD 5000.1 from 1971 through the still-valid 2007 version. 
Uses of the words “evolutionary,” “incremental,” or “block” upgrades first appear in the 1980s 
versions, gradually increase through the 1990s versions, and peak in the early 2000s 
versions.  
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Table 2. DoDD 5000.1 Summary of EA and ID Word Use. Data From DoDD 5000.1 
Dated 1971, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2003, and 
2007. 
 
In the 1985 and 1986 versions, the DoDD 5000.1 encouraged PMs to “consider 
evolutionary alternatives” to reduce programmatic risk and not rely on solutions that push 
the technology envelope (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & 
Engineering [OUSD(R&E)], 1985a, 1986a). The 1987 version introduces the concept that 
the evolutionary strategy should be linked to the maturity of technologies (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition [OUSD(A)], 1987a). 
The 1996 version further elaborates on the use of “non-traditional acquisition” and 
that incremental acquisition requires technology insertion. “Where appropriate, managers in 
the acquisition community shall make use of non-traditional acquisition techniques, such as 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), rapid prototyping, evolutionary 
and incremental acquisition, and flexible technology insertion” (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology [OUSD(A&T)], 1996). 
The 2000 and 2001 versions have the most extensive use of the words 
“evolutionary,” “incremental,” and “block upgrades.” The 2000 version builds upon the 
themes in the 1996 version, which linked evolutionary acquisition to the technology maturity, 
and also referenced the need for time-phased requirements. “Time-phased requirements 
are essential to evolutionary acquisition strategies and are strongly encouraged as a 
preferred approach to establishing and documenting operational needs” (OUSD[AT&L], 
2000). For the first time, the DoDD clearly defined evolutionary acquisition in terms of 
“increments” or “blocks” of capability: 
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Evolutionary Acquisition. To ensure that the Defense Acquisition System 
provides useful military capability to the operational user as rapidly as 
possible, evolutionary acquisition strategies shall be the preferred approach 
to satisfying operational needs. Evolutionary acquisition strategies define, 
develop, and produce/deploy an initial, militarily useful capability (“Block I”) 
based on proven technology, time-phased requirements, projected threat 
assessments, and demonstrated manufacturing capabilities, and plan for 
subsequent development and production/deployment of increments beyond 
the initial capability over time (Blocks II, III, and beyond). In planning 
evolutionary acquisition strategies, program managers shall strike an 
appropriate balance among key factors, including the urgency of the 
operational requirement; the maturity of critical technologies; and the 
interoperability, supportability, and affordability of alternative acquisition 
solutions. (OUSD[AT&L], 2000) 
It is interesting that the 2003 version of the DoDD emphasizes evolutionary 
strategies as the preferred approach but introduces “spiral development” as the preferred 
process and deletes references to increments or blocks (OUSD[AT&L], 2003). 
The 2007 DoDD maintains nearly the same language as the 2003 version with the 
important change of replacing the word “spiral” with “incremental:” 
Responsiveness. Advanced technology shall be integrated into producible 
systems and deployed in the shortest time practicable. Approved, time-
phased capability needs matched with available technology and resources 
enable evolutionary acquisition strategies. Evolutionary acquisition strategies 
are the preferred approach to satisfying operational needs. Incremental 
development is the preferred process for executing such strategies. 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2007)    
In addition to the DoDD, the accompanying DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 evolved 
over time but not necessarily in lock-step with the directive updates. Table 3 tracks the use 
of the words “evolutionary,” “increment,” or “block” over the different versions of the DoDI. 
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Table 3. DoDI 5000.2 Summary of EA and ID Word Use. Data From DoDI 5000.2 
Dated 1980, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1993, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2013, 
2015, and 2017. 
 
The 1991 DoDI issued by the USD(A), sees a spike in the use of the word 
“evolutionary” with reference to ID and preplanned product improvement approaches 
(OUSD[A], 1991). The 2002 DoDI 5000.02 combined guidance for major defense acquisition 
programs with major automated information systems and an associated spike in the use of 
the words “evolutionary” and “increment/s” and a large spike in the use of the term “block,” 
especially for software-intensive IT systems (OUSD[AT&L], 2002). The 2003 DoDI 5000.02 
specifies, “Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of 
mature technology for the user” (OUSD[AT&L], 2003). The 2003 version also explains the 
two options for development approaches: spiral or incremental.  
Similar to the DoDD 5000.01, the 2008 DoDI 5000.02 deletes references to spiral 
development and emphasizes incremental development and that each increment should 
deliver a militarily useful capability to the warfighter.   
Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of 
mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability 
in increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future capability 
improvements. The objective is to balance needs and available capability with 
resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user quickly.  
Evolutionary acquisition requires collaboration among the user, tester, and 
developer. In this process, a needed operational capability is met over time 
by developing several increments, each dependent on available mature 
technology. Technology development preceding initiation of an increment 
shall continue until the required level of maturity is achieved, and prototypes 
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of the system or key system elements are produced. Successive Technology 
Development Phases may be necessary to mature technology for multiple 
development increments. 
Each increment is a militarily useful and supportable operational capability 
that can be developed, produced, deployed, and sustained. Each increment 
will have its own set of threshold and objective values set by the user. Block 
upgrades, pre-planned product improvement, and similar efforts that provide 
a significant increase in operational capability and meet an acquisition 
category threshold specified in this document shall be managed as separate 
increments under this Instruction. (OUSD[AT&L], 2008) 
The 2013, 2015, and 2017 versions of the DoDI 5000.02 continue to emphasize 
incremental development approaches but no longer use the word “evolutionary.” These 
instructions lay out typical schedule models for hardware-intensive, software-intensive, and 
hybrid development efforts.  
Literature Review  
Despite the emphasis of EA and ID within statutes, DoD regulations and directives, 
and acquisition reform initiatives, research in the area is limited primarily to case studies of 
acquisition programs. The following work basically observed the importance of incremental 
development approaches to reduce technical risk and speed delivery of capability to the 
warfighter. 
• 1998, GAO report titled Best Practices—Successful Application to Weapon 
Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD’s Environment (GAO, 1998). 
• 2003, feature article in Computer titled Iterative and Incremental 
Development: A Brief History (Larman & Basili, 2003). 
• 2001, research on the application of EA within the DoD (Williams, 2001).  
• 2003, GAO report titled DoD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, 
but More Controls Are Needed (GAO, 2003b).  
• 2003, GAO report titled Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are 
Possible if DoD Can Apply Lessons from the F/A-22 Program (GAO, 2003a).  
• 2005, GAO report titled DoD Acquisition Outcomes―A Case for Change 
(GAO, 2005a). 
• 2005, GAO report titled Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike 
Fighter Program With Different Acquisition Strategy (GAO, 2005b). 
• 2005, RAND report titled Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform―Are We 
There Yet? for the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics, 
and technology (ASA[ALT]; Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 
2005).  
• 2006, GAO report titled Defense Acquisitions—Major Weapon Systems 
Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DoD Revised 
Policy (GAO, 2006). 
• 2008, research titled The Costs and Risks of Maturing Technologies, 
Traditional vs. Evolutionary Approaches (Pennock & Rouse, 2008)  
• 2009, a case study for the successful application of EA principles for 
management of the Navy’s torpedo enterprise (Bussiere, Jester, & Sodhi, 
2009). 
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• 2011, in Defense Acquisition Reform 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal, J. Ronald 
Fox (2011) writes, 
Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid 
acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary 
approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing up front the 
need for future capability improvements. The objective is to balance 
needs and available capability with resources and to put capability into 
the hands of the user quickly. The success of the strategy depends on 
the phased definition of capability needs and system requirements and 
the maturation of technologies that lead to disciplined development 
and production of systems that provide increasing capability over time. 
(Fox, 2011)  
• 2009, a study of two defense acquisition programs as case studies (Dillard & 
Ford, 2009). 
• 2010, work by Bodner, Rahman, and Rouse (Bodner et al., 2010). 
• 2014, RAND study titled Prolonged Cycle Times and Schedule Growth in 
Defense Acquisition (Riposo, McKernan, & Duran, 2014).  
• 2014, GAO report titled Agencies Need to Establish and Implement 
Incremental Development Policies (GAO, 2014). 
• 2016, GAO report titled Agencies Need to Increase Their Use of Incremental 
Development Practices (GAO, 2016). 
• 2015, GAO report titled Amphibious Combat Vehicle―Marine Corps Adopts 
an Incremental Approach (GAO, 2015a). 
• 2015, GAO report titled Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle—The Air Force 
Needs to Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to 
Enable Incorporation of Lessons Learned (GAO, 2015b).  
• 2017, RAND study titled Program Characteristics That Contribute to Cost 
Growth (Lorell, Payne, & Mehta, 2017).  
• 2017, GAO report to Congress on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program 
(GAO, 2017). 
Acquisition Strategy Survey―Research Methodology and Data 
The benefits of EA with an ID approach are well-documented commercial industry 
best practices for delivering customer products within performance, cost, and schedule 
constraints. With beginnings in software-intensive development efforts, the use of EA and ID 
naturally spread to hardware-intensive development efforts. However, as discussed, the 
successful application to DoD acquisition efforts is spotty at best. Directives, regulations, 
and statutes have given guidance on the application of EA and ID over a period of three 
decades. This research narrowly focuses on how PMs can more effectively apply EA with an 
ID approach to a development effort.  
The JCM case study investigates how PMs develop an evolutionary acquisition 
strategy with an incremental development approach. The case study surveys acquisition 
professionals and asks them to develop an acquisition strategy using the actual JCM 
program decision input data. These proposed strategies are then compared to the Joint Air 
to Ground Missile (JAGM) program strategy subsequently executed by the Army and Navy. 
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Insights into the importance of various decision inputs to PMs will provide policy 
recommendations for the DoD to consider to better support PMs in developing the 
department’s preferred strategy―EA with an ID approach. This research focuses on 
studying the original JCM decision inputs (requirements, funding, technology readiness, and 
risk assessments) to see if the JAGM strategy that was subsequently executed could have 
been predicted, thus avoiding a “lost decade” and possibly delivering capability to 
warfighters sooner. 
Problem statement: It is incredibly difficult for the PMs to implement the DoD-
preferred strategy of EA with an ID approach.  
• Primary objective: Develop insights into the importance of typical 
programmatic decision inputs to the development of an acquisition providing 
insights into the following questions:  
• Primary question: Can a program manager or acquisition professional 
predict an actual acquisition strategy implemented given typical programmatic 
decision inputs? 
• Secondary questions: 
o What is the most important factor in determining the recommended 
acquisition strategy? 
o How can the decision input factors be changed to enable a program 
manager or acquisition professional to recommend an appropriate, 
risk-based, knowledge-based, incremental development approach? 
The JCM case study focuses on a program that does not have requirements that are 
time-phased. Therefore, PMs use the inputs of resources (primarily funding) and technology 
maturity (primarily technology readiness levels and risk assessments) to try to develop a 
strategy to meet the warfighter’s required needs and timelines as well as be affordable for 
the service. Implementing an appropriate incremental development strategy requires an 
understanding of the strategic environment, key stakeholders, change leadership, 
organizational behavior, strategic leadership, and decision-making. 
The JCM program was a Joint (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) effort to replace Hellfire, 
Maverick, and aviation-launched, tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 
missiles fired from both rotary wing (AH-64 Apaches, AH-1 Cobras, and MH-60 Seahawks) 
and fixed wing (F/A18 D/F Super Hornets) aircraft, initiated in the late 1990s. The JCM 
program had a successful Milestone B (MS B) in early 2005 with an approved capabilities 
development document (CDD) and awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) contract. In late 2005, the JCM program was canceled. Ten years later, 
in 2015, the follow-on program, now renamed the Joint Air to Ground Missile (JAGM), 
emerged with a successful MS B and again awarded another EMD contract. 
The acquisition strategy survey puts the participant in the shoes of a PM as they 
prepare for the approval of the JCM program of record to start EMD and asks for a 
recommendation of an appropriate strategy―single step or incremental―based on program 
requirements and constraints. 
The baseline survey provides acquisition professionals with the actual JCM MS B 
data used by the PM, program management office (PMO), program executive offices 
(PEOs), service acquisition executives, and milestone decision authority (the defense 
acquisition executive who at the time was the USD[AT&L]). The survey data is consolidated 
into the important program information to include background program data, the draft 
acquisition program baseline, the service’s affordability determinations, the independent 
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cost estimate, the risk assessment, and technology readiness levels (TRLs) of the critical 
technology elements (CTEs). Figure 3 outlines the general survey approach. 
 
Figure 3. Acquisition Strategy Survey Approach 
The inputs to the survey include three main areas: technology, requirements, and 
resources. The Army and Navy planned the JCM program for about a decade prior to the 
MS B or official designation of the program of record and start of the EMD phase. The 
science and technology communities matured the underlying missile technologies through 
science and technology (S&T) objectives and a technology maturation and risk reduction 
phase. A high-level government work breakdown structure (WBS) enabled a risk 
assessment for the JCM development effort as well as TRL determinations for the CTEs of 
the missile. As the same time as the missile technologies were being matured, the 
requirements generation system, formally named the Joint Capabilities, Development, and 
Integration System (JCIDS), completed both a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) and an 
analysis of alternative (AoA). The CBA and AoA supported the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) approval of the JCM capability development document (CDD), 
which contained key performance parameters (KPPs), initial operational capability (IOC) 
dates, acquisition objective (AO), and an average unit procurement cost (AUPC). 
Simultaneous to the technology maturation and requirements solidification, the resourcing 
plan for a JCM program was being worked on in the planning, programming, budgeting, and 
execution (PPBE) system. The JCM business case analysis supported the JCM program 
office estimate (POE), the Army and Navy program objective memorandum (POM) 
submissions, and an independent cost estimate (ICE).  
The survey provides each individual data to make an informed recommendation on 
the most appropriate acquisition strategy. The survey participants make a recommendation 
to pursue a single-step development approach, a two-increment development approach, or 
a three-increment development approach based on the following programmatic data: the 
draft MS B acquisition program baseline, the WBS risk rating, and a CTE TRL for the three 
missile areas. The performance sections of the acquisition program baseline (APB) are the 
approved CDD KPPs. The schedule section of the APB came from the approved IOC date 
found in the CDD, and the cost section of the APB came from the approved AO and AUPC, 
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also found in the CDD. An ICE provided alternative schedule and cost constraints for survey 
participants to consider. Survey participants were then asked for the capabilities, cost, and 
schedule for their recommended acquisition strategy. The survey had boundary constraints 
with respect to performance, cost, and schedule. For example, with respect to performance, 
acquisition professionals only decided whether the desired KPP requirements were 
developed or delayed to a later increment. With respect to schedule and cost, the 
participants decided only whether to recommend the services’ estimate or the ICE numbers.  
The survey was intended to be taken by acquisition professionals in the DoD 
acquisition workforce. “The acquisition workforce is generally defined as uniformed and 
civilian government personnel, who are responsible for identifying, developing, buying, and 
managing goods and services to support the military” (Schwartz, Francis, & O’Conner, 
2016). The size of the acquisition workforce has stabilized to approximately 150,000 total 
personnel (about 90% civilian and 10% uniformed personnel) across 14 distinct career fields 
that include engineering, contracting, life-cycle logistics, program management, production 
& quality management, test & evaluation, facilities engineering, business–financial 
management, information technology, auditing, science & technology management 
business–cost estimating, purchasing, and property (Schwartz et al., 2016).  
As stated previously, the baseline survey used the following actual JCM MS B data 
for eight risk ratings and three TRL ratings: 
• Critical Technology Element (CTE) TRLs: 
o Tri-mode seeker (s): 6 
o Multipurpose warhead (w): 6 
o Common motor (m): 6 
• Risk ratings (RR) based on JCM WBS: 
o Tri-mode seeker (s): medium (m) 
o Multipurpose warhead (w): medium/high (m/h) 
o Common motor (m): medium (m) 
o Missile integration (i): medium/high (m/h) 
o AH-64 Apache platform integration (64): medium (m) 
o AH-1 Cobra platform integration (1): medium (m) 
o MH-60 Seahawk platform integration (60): medium (m) 
o F/A18E/F Super Hornet platform integration (18): medium (m) 
[Note that the risk ratings had a range from low (l), low/medium (l/m), medium (m), 
medium/high (m/h) to high (h).] 
The original JCM acquisition strategy recommended by the Army and Navy, 
supported by the warfighters, and approved by the DAE in the spring of 2005 after a 
successful MS B was a single-step development effort that included all the KPPs. The JCM 
program was later canceled as a program of record by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), and re-designated as a technology base effort (Wolfowitz, 2004). 
Eventually, the effort was renamed as the JAGM program. The JAGM program was 
approved as a program of record and successfully awarded an EMD contract after an MS B 
approval in 2015 (10 years after the first attempt for an EMD program of record). However, 
the capabilities to be delivered under the JAGM program were greatly reduced from the 
capabilities desired in the JCM program. Figure 4 displays the differences between the JCM 
and JAGM programs. The documented lessons learned emphasized the avoidance of 
extensive unprioritized requirements, multiple threshold platforms, and the fixed wing F18 
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platform in particular. The Army’s and Navy’s lessons applied to the JAGM effort 
emphasized an EA on the warfighter’s highest priorities, reduced the threshold platforms, 
and leveraged the existing HELLFIRE missile warhead and motor to reduce risk, cost, and 
schedule.  
 
Figure 4. Acquisition Strategy Survey Approach 
(Adapted from Gress, Kohtz, & Noll, 2018) 
 
Data 
The survey participants included 31 acquisition professionals representing a broad 
spectrum across the DoD, including active duty officers and government civilians from the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force. All the respondents were members of the acquisition workforce 
with various Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) acquisition 
certifications as well as graduate education degrees.   
The baseline survey uses the actual JCM MS B data and asks survey participants to 
develop an appropriate acquisition strategy based on this data. Survey #1 results are 
presented in Table 4. We are interested in how many individuals predicted the JAGM 
strategy that was actually adopted based on the original JCM data. The first hypothesis was 
that the JAGM strategy would be nearly impossible for acquisition professionals to predict 
based on the pressures to deliver all KPPs by the required IOC with the cost constraints of 
the service-approved POE. Based on the nearly constant emphasis by senior leaders and 
Congress over many years on affordability and rapid acquisition, the second hypothesis was 
that acquisition professionals would reduce risk by maintaining the cost and schedule 
constraints in the draft APB and reduce programmatic risk by recommending delaying 
performance capabilities (pushing some KPPs to later increments). Given that an 
incremental strategy was recommended, the third hypothesis was that acquisition 
professionals would choose to delay capabilities associated with technologies with low TRL 
ratings and/or high risk ratings. 
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Table 4. Survey Data Results 
 
 
Hypothesis #1: A low percentage of acquisition professionals would be able to 
predict the JAGM acquisition strategy from the JCM MS B data. For a sample size of 31, 
seven of 31 (23%) recommended a single step approach, 13 of 31 (42%) recommended two 
increments, and 11 of 31 (35%) recommended three increments. None (zero of 31, or 0%) 
of the respondents recommended an acquisition strategy even remotely close the JAGM 
strategy (dual mode seeker, COTS warhead, COTS motor, and integration of only AH64 and 
AH1 in first increment)―confirming hypothesis #1 that it is extremely difficult to predict a 
successful acquisition strategy based on typical MS B programmatic data.  
Hypothesis #2: Most acquisition professionals would maintain the approved service 
cost and schedule constraints and chose to delay capability, given the JCM MS B data. For 
single-step acquisition, five of seven respondents (71%) chose the ICE recommended six-
year schedule and $153,000 acquisition unit procurement cost (AUPC) with no capability 
increments, and two of seven (29%) of the respondents chose a four-year or 12-year 
schedule and $120,000 AUPC with no capability increments. For the first increment in two 
increment strategies, six of 13 (39%) recommended delaying some capability with a first 
increment schedule of six or 12 years with ICE recommended $153,000 AUPC, and seven 
of 13 (54%) recommended delaying some capability with a first increment schedule of 4four 
years and $120,000 AUPC. For the first increment in three increment strategies, seven of 11 
(64%) recommended delaying some capability but maintaining the service approved four-
year schedule and $108,000 AUPC. In summary, only 14 of 31 respondents (45%) decided 
to maintain the approved service cost and schedule constraints and incrementalize 
capability―disproving hypothesis #2. 
Hypothesis #3: For those acquisition professionals that recommend an incremental 
approach, they would recommend delaying capabilities linked to technologies with low TRLs 
and/or high risk ratings. For the baseline survey, 24 of 31 (77%) recommended an 
incremental approach, with 13 recommending two increments and 11 recommending three 
increments. Of the 13 recommending a two increment approach, eight of 13 delayed seeker 
capability, seven of 13 delayed warhead capability, three of 13 delayed motor capability, and 
11 of 13 delayed a platform to increment two. Of the 11 recommending a three increment 
approach, nine of 11 delayed seeker capability, eight of 11 delayed warhead capability, 10 
of 11 delayed motor capability, and eight of 11 delayed a platform to later increments. For 
the baseline survey, the three CTEs had a TRL of 6, six risk areas were ranked as medium 
risk, and the warhead and integration were ranked as medium/high. These results neither 
confirm nor deny hypothesis #3 because the warhead was highlighted as higher risk, and 15 
of 24 (63%) respondents pushed the multipurpose warhead to a later increment. However, 
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17 of 24 (71%) respondents pushed the seeker to a later increment despite the tri-mode 
seeker having the same TRL rating as the multipurpose warhead and a lower risk rating. 
The recommended approaches appear to be not entirely data-driven based on the CTE TRL 
and risk ratings.  
Analysis of Results  
The survey results are incredibly interesting. The results confirm what many 
acquisition professionals already know―it is extremely hard to predict the acquisition 
strategy actually implemented for a complex defense research and development effort. The 
inputs to the survey here are very typical of data that would be provided to the milestone 
decision authorities to approve acquisition strategies. Some might argue that more data is 
needed to make a truly informed decision; however, in reality, less data is normally 
available. In this case, the requirements were well established and supported by years of 
analysis with a set need date. The technologies needed to turn those requirements into 
capabilities for the warfighter had matured to the point that they were ready for integration, 
and the funding to support a program of record for a development and engineering work and 
procurement of missiles was aligned to the required need date. The PM triple constant of 
cost, schedule, and performance were all synchronized and set. However, the costs were 
underestimated while the technical risks (specifically the integration risks) were 
underappreciated, which led to a high-risk, un-executable program that was eventually 
canceled.  
PMs basically have a few choices to reduce risk―either request more time and 
money for the effort as defined, or request a reduction in scope for the time and money 
available. Requesting more money or additional schedule for a development program that 
has been in the works for several years is unrealistic and would probably fall on deaf ears to 
service leaders who already approved the funding and the schedule to go along with that 
funding. The more likely choice to reduce risk would be to keep the cost and schedule 
constraints in place and recommend a reduction in scope or performance capability. This is 
a hard thing for the PM to recommend because the warfighter wants all of their required 
capability. This is where the benefits of an incremental development approach can help 
alleviate some concerns by delivering improved capability (albeit not full desired capability) 
in increments while the full capability is developed simultaneously. In this case, 71% 
recommended an incremental development approach―indicating good training and 
education of the acquisition workforce on the benefits of ID and EA. Additionally, the 
majority of acquisition professionals recommended delaying the capabilities associated with 
the higher risk. 
Even though the majority of acquisition professionals recommended an ID approach, 
only 41% maintained the cost and schedule constraints. The majority of acquisition 
professionals believed that they not only had to reduce performance by delaying 
requirements, but they also had to recommend a longer schedule and request more funding. 
This puts the PMs in the difficult position of not being able to deliver on cost, schedule, or 
performance requirements. There is tremendous pressure on the PM to get the program 
approved as a program of record. This pressure must be balanced with the PM’s risk of 
trying to execute a program with a high probability of encountering cost over-runs, schedule 
slips, and underperformance in delivering the proposed capabilities.  
Future Research 
Future work investigating the relative importance of TRL ratings versus risk ratings in 
determining the recommended strategy would shed light on the importance of these ratings. 
This effort centers on the question, “How can original JCM milestone data be changed to 
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have a greater percentage of acquisition professionals recommend a JAGM incremental 
approach?” Table 5 represents a design-of-experiments approach showing how the eight 
risk ratings and TRL ratings could vary over the 14 versions of the survey. 
Table 5. Survey Descriptions 
 
A comparison of the results between surveys #1–#4 would be undertaken to see if 
acquisition professionals recommend an incremental approach to the development of the tri-
mode seeker in situations with a low seeker TRL and/or high seeker risk rating. Surveys #1 
and #5–#7 would confirm the results of surveys #1–#4 by varying the warhead data rather 
than the seeker data. Similarly, surveys #8–#12 would study the missile motor as well as the 
platforms that would accept the missile. For example, the results of survey #9 would answer 
the question, “Did a higher percentage of acquisition professionals recommend delaying 
integration of the missile onto the F18 platform if the risk rating was high rather than 
medium?” Survey #13 would study the importance of the integration risk rating in relation to 
the CTE TRLs or CTE risk ratings. The results of this survey may indicate that the 
integration readiness level (IRL) has the same level of acceptance as TRLs and 
manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs) within acquisition policy. The results of survey #14 
would confirm that acquisition professionals do indeed recommend an incremental approach 
at higher percentages when the TRLs are low and risk ratings are high. Survey #14 data 
input is set up to try to see if respondents recommended a JAGM strategy more than the 
baseline data in survey #1.  
Conclusions/Recommendations 
The work highlights the importance of the service affordability constraints in 
establishing the acquisition program’s cost and schedule parameters in the acquisition 
program baseline. After cost and schedule constraints are set, the senior leaders, 
acquisition professionals, and warfighters must come together and agree on an incremental 
approach to deliver some capability as soon as possible to the warfighter and delay the full 
capability to later increments. If this struggle does not happen initially for a complex 
development program, then the program may never deliver capability because of the high 
risk of cancellation due to schedule slips and cost over-runs.  
Once the program’s cost and schedule parameters are planned, programmed, and 
budgeted in the service program objective memorandum, the program’s only risk mitigation 
strategy is to delay desired capability to later increments. PMs must coordinate and balance 
the inputs from the science and technology, testing, and warfighter communities to 
recommend the integration of the least risky technologies for inclusion in the first increment 
of a new warfighting capability. Both the use of TRLs and risk ratings for the development of 
CTEs and integration risk ratings (along with an IRL) would help increase the chance of 
program success (defined in terms of improved fielded capability to warfighters). 
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In the case of the JCM program, the cost and schedule constraints indicated the 
need to recommend an incremental development approach and delay some capability to 
later increments. The JCM program was canceled after a successful MS B, and it took more 
than 10 years for the new JAGM program to successfully pass an MS B—this time with an 
incremental approach that leveraged existing government furnished equipment (GFE) 
components. Meanwhile, during this “lost decade,” the warfighter got none of the desired 
capabilities required. The DoDD 5000.1 should mandate that programs of record establish 
hard cost and schedule caps for development efforts and then allow the services the ability 
to fit what is affordable from a performance (requirements) perspective into the first 
increment of the program of record by delaying the achievement of some requirements 
(even KPPs) to subsequent increments to allow more time for technology maturation. 
Warfighters would benefit from some capability increase, and acquisition programs would be 
less likely to fail due to cost over-runs and/or schedule slips. 
The defense acquisition system must break the outdated concept of the PM’s triple 
constraint of cost, schedule, and performance. The triple constraint unnecessarily ties the 
hands of the PMs and contributes to high program failure and no delivered capability. The 
bottom line is that if all three—cost, schedule, and performance—are set, then the program 
has a high risk of failure. If we allow the affordability to set the constraints of cost and 
schedule, which we must do in a public institution like defense acquisition, then flexibility in 
determining which requirements to pursue by allowing incremental development approaches 
would loosen the triple constraint stranglehold. In the end, the warfighter must determine if 
the first capability increment offers enough capability improvement over the current systems 
to warrant the investment of time and money. The current defense acquisition system 
incentivizes PMs to get through an improved milestone—oftentimes with a program that is 
un-executable in terms of cost, schedule, and performance and has a high risk of 
cancellation and failure. The system should incentivize fielded and delivered warfighter 
capability. 
The following are specific defense acquisition policy recommendations as a result of 
this study: 
• For major defense acquisition programs, especially development efforts, the 
DoDD5000.1 should continue to state the preferred approach as incremental 
development, but it should go further by requiring milestone decision 
authorities (MDAs) to justify any single-step acquisition, making incremental 
development the default strategy. 
• The use of TRLs for specific component technologies is well entrenched in 
defense acquisition training for PMs, specifically the requirement for all 
competent technologies to be at TRL 6 for a Milestone B or entry to the 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase. However, TRLs 
alone do not provide sufficient information for PMs and MDAs to make well-
informed choices on appropriate incremental strategies. Component 
technology TRLs should be augmented with risk ratings. Specifically, risk 
ratings should be medium or lower for all program-identified risks before 
proceeding into the EMD phase of the first increment. 
• The integration risk should be specifically addressed at all milestone reviews, 
either through the program risk assessment or the introduction of an 
integration readiness level (IRL), similar to the TRL and MRL levels. 
• The DoD should consider mandating that the program risk assessment, as 
well as TRL and MRL ratings, be performed independently from the program 
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management office and PM assessments. Similar to the requirement for an 
independent cost estimate (ICE) at a milestone review to compare to the 
program office estimate (POE), MDAs would have an independent program 
risk assessment and independent TRL, MRL, and IRL ratings in order to 
make more informed decisions.  
This study focused on the challenges PMs have in formulating the DoD’s preferred 
approach—an incremental development strategy. The conclusions and recommendations 
focus on acquisition policy changes to better optimize the implementation of incremental 
development strategies. The goal is to make the defense acquisition system more 
responsive to the warfighter by fielding improved capability as quickly as possible and 
reducing risk to the eventual delivery of the full required capability. A proposed extension of 
this research is a “new” area of research called “behavioral acquisition.” Similar to 
behavioral finance that studies both economics and psychology within finance decision-
making, behavioral acquisition would combine the study of program management, 
organizational dynamics, defense acquisition, and psychology within acquisition decision-
making. A paradigm shift may be required within defense acquisition to realize the 
importance of research in behavioral acquisition. A solid understanding of how acquisition 
professionals critically think and make decisions/recommendations in the complex defense 
acquisition environment would lead to improved acquisition strategy planning and better 
acquisition program outcomes—specifically, delivered warfighter capability as soon as 
possible.   
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